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DISABILITY POLICIES AND EMPLOYMENT 
– FINLAND COMPARED WITH THE OTHER 
NORDIC COUNTRIES1
The potential of the disabled and the partly incapaci-
tated to use their remaining working capacity on the 
labour market has rapidly emerged as a subject of 
public interest in Finland. This interest stems above 
all from the aim of preventing a decrease in work in-
put due to the ageing of the population, for example 
through abandoning the dichotomy of living on an 
income from work on the one hand and living on 
social security on the other. Instead of the current 
either/or model, new solutions enabling combina-
tions of paid work and social security are sought so 
as to improve both the welfare of individuals and 
the working capacity of society at large.
International comparative data are needed to sup-
port public debate in Finland. A useful framework 
is to be found in the OECD Disability Survey (2003, 
2005), in whose latest round Finland is participating. 
The purpose of the organization is to study social 
security policy and labour market policy aimed at 
the disabled, taking into account the opportunities 
offered for the partly incapacitated and the handi-
capped in various areas of policy on the one hand 
and the incentives for employers and employees in 
the system on the other.
According to the OECD (2007), social security and 
labour market policies have in many countries con-
verged in the 2000s, especially in the approach to the 
problem of partial work disability in benefit systems 
and labour market services. In countries that have 
reformed their policies, the focus has shifted from 
cash benefits to subsidized employment and other 
active measures. Whether these reforms lead to an 
increase in employment and social participation, or 
whether the result is an even higher risk of poverty 
for groups who are in a vulnerable position on the 
labour market is emerging as an important issue. 
Benefits and targeted measures for the 
partly incapacitated 
Finland’s closest reference group consists of the 
other Nordic countries. Table 1 is a comparison of 
the legislation of the Nordic countries in the matter 
of cash benefits for partial incapacity for work and 
measures targeted at the partly incapacitated. In-
come security is here understood to include sickness 
benefits and disability pensions (or corresponding 
long-term benefits). The description of pensions in-
cludes the amount of money the recipient is allowed 
to earn in parallel with the pension and options 
which allow people to suspend their pension while 
they try out a return to work. The data on income 
replacement benefits are based on information from 
social welfare authorities in the Nordic countries, 
and the descriptions of measures are based on the 
Eurostat Active Labour Market Policy database. 
The legislative comparison highlights considerable 
differences between the Nordic countries. Finland 
has the narrowest range of partial benefits and 
targeted measures. The partial sickness allowance 
introduced at the beginning of 2007 mainly serves 
the trying out of a return to work through work-
ing arrangements on a reduced scale and cannot 
be considered a partial benefit in the sense that 
benefits scaled to a decrease in working capacity 
can. In Finland, partial benefits based on different 
grades of working capacity only exist in employ-
ment pensions. A person will receive a full pension 
if his/her earning capacity has decreased by at least 
3/5 and a partial pension of the decrease is at least 
2/5 but below 3/5. 
In Finland so far, active labour market measures 
for the partly incapacitated have been managed on 
the ‘mainstream’ principle, meaning that the labour 
administration has not had any special measures for 
the partly incapacitated at all. However, employment 
which can be described as sheltered work is provided 
as municipal services under the Social Welfare Act. 
In recent years, there have been efforts to increase the 
employment of the partly incapacitated within the 
sphere of general programmes. The labour market 
reform of 2006 even enabled the provision of per-
manent employment with a maximum subsidy of 
50%. Monitoring data on the use of these subsidies 
has not yet been available. 
In Denmark, income security cash benefits are only 
used to provide for the livelihood of the completely 
incapacitated, while labour market policy measures 
cover those persons who are permanently partly 
incapacitated (by at least 50%). The partly inca-
pacitated have a subjective right to ‘flexible work’ 
found on the open labour market and fulfilling the 
criteria of collective agreements but with pay subsi-
dized by the government. Before qualifying for this, 
however, the person has to go through all possibili-1 Originally published in Finnish in Talous & Yhteiskunta 2008; (1): 42–49.
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Table 1. Benefits for the partly incapacitated and labour policy measures specifically aimed at the partly 
incapicitated in the Nordic countries in 2005.
Sources: 
1 The Finnish Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela); The Finnish Centre for Pensions (ETK); Försäkringskassan; Rikstrygdeverket/NAV; 
NOSOSCO; Øverbye 2006.
2 Eurostat 2006 and 2007.
Benefit/measure Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Income security benefits offered to the partly incapacitated through social security1
Partial sickness 
allowance
Experiment with a 
return to work (max 
72 days), working 
capacity assessment 
as with full sickness 
allowance.
As per reduction 
in working 
capacity: full, 3/4, 
1/2, 1/4.
As per reduction in 
working capacity in 
increments of 5%, 
min 20%. 
Hour-for-hour.
Partial disability 
pension
Reduction in 
working capacity: 
employment 
pension, at least 2/5 
but less than 3/5; 
national pension, 
no partial benefit 
available.
As per reduction 
in working 
capacity: full, 3/4, 
1/2, 1/4.
As per reduction in 
working capacity in 
increments of 5%, 
min 50%.
No partial 
pension. See 
‘flexjob’ below.
Possibility to 
earn income 
while on pension
Income limit: 
employment 
pension, 2/5 and 
3/5 pensionable 
income; national 
pension, EUR 558 
per month.
Work input in a 
full benefit no 
more than 1/8 of 
normal working 
hours.
Income limit equal to 
full national pension. 
Income limit 
exists but is not 
known to the 
author.
Possibility to 
suspend pension
Full national 
pension: max 5 
years, first 2 years 
entitle to highest 
rate of disability 
support.
Max 2 years, of 
which 3 months 
overlapping pay 
income.
Max 5 years. No time limit.
Labour market policy measures for the partly incapacitated2
Indefinite 
sheltered work, 
etc.
Sheltered work 
provided under the 
Social Welfare Act.
1. Work 
intended for 
the socially and 
medically partly 
incapacitated 
(OSA);
2. Work in the 
government-
owned company 
named Samhall. 
Work done under 
sheltered conditions 
and subsidized 
from public 
funds or through 
rehabilitation funds.
1. ‘Flexjob’ for 
those not entitled 
to a full pension;
2. Subsidized 
employment 
for those on a 
pension. 
Fixed-term 
pay subsidy 
on the open 
labour market 
(employment 
incentives)
        –       
Max 4 years, 
subsidy max 80%, 
or 100% for the 
severely disabled.
Subsidies for 
various groups of 
partly incapacitated 
persons in normal 
employment 
relationships.
For acquiring 
work experience 
after leaving 
vocational 
education.
Direct job 
creation on 
public funds
        –              –        
For acquiring 
work experience 
in employment 
relationships that 
would not exist 
without the subsidy. 
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ties for restoring his/her working capacity through 
treatment or rehabilitation. As usual in Denmark, 
the principles underlying the benefits and labour 
market policy emphasize a high level of solidarity 
while requiring the person himself/herself to make 
active efforts in order to qualify for benefits.
In Sweden and Norway, the partly incapacitated are 
supported through both benefit systems and labour 
market policy measures. Sickness allowance and 
disability pensions are graded according to earning 
capacity, and there are several forms of subsidized 
employment available. Sweden provides employ-
ment for the partly incapacitated in two different 
ways: on the open labour market with pay subsi-
dies, and in sheltered work mostly for the govern-
ment-owned company named Samhall. InNorway, 
sheltered work, subsidized employment and jobs 
created through direct job creation schemes are all 
on offer.
In order to understand the differences between the 
Nordic countries in the possibilities for combin-
ing work and benefits, it is also important to know 
how much benefit recipients can earn in income 
without losing their benefits, and how these limits 
depend on the grading of the benefit according to 
the degree of incapacity. In Finland, a person with a 
full employment pension may have an income from 
work that is no more than 2/5 of the pensionable 
income; otherwise the pension will be converted into 
a partial disability pension. Similarly, a partial pen-
sion is completely discontinued when the recipient’s 
income from work exceeds 3/5 of the pensionable 
income. For persons on a full national pension, the 
income limit is a fixed EUR 589 per month. In cases 
where a person is entitled to both a national pension 
and an employment pension, a conflicting situation 
and an incentive problem may arise. In this group, 
which includes about 40% of all disability pension 
recipients, the possibility of combining income from 
work with a pension is determined according to that 
pension legislation which is more disadvantageous 
to the recipient.
In Sweden, recipients of full benefits are allowed a 
small work effort, equal to 1/8 of the working hours 
of a person of normal working capacity, or about 5 
hours per week. In the case of partial benefits, re-
cipients are allowed paid employment to the extent 
determined by the degree of incapacity. In Norway, 
recipients of a full disability pension may earn in-
come from work equal to the current amount of the 
national pension. Additional income is also allowed 
in Denmark, but this figure is not known.
In all Scandinavian countries, a pension can be 
suspended under certain conditions if the recipient 
wishes to try out a return to work. Under Finnish 
legislation, by contrast, suspending a pension in 
order to try out a return to work is possible only for 
incapacitated persons who have been granted a full 
and indefinite national pension, i.e. persons who, 
in practice, have never participated in working life. 
A pension can be suspended for a maximum of 5 
years, during the first two years of which the person 
is entitled to the highest level of disability allowance. 
It is scarcely surprising then that the number of 
persons who have chosen to suspend their national 
pension has yet to reach triple digits. An employ-
ment pension cannot be suspended, but it can be 
discontinued for a maximum of one year.
Usage rates of benefits and measures 
for the partly incapacitated
The fact that Finland’s policy on incapacity for work 
differs from that of the other Nordic countries is 
also demonstrated by the usage rates of various 
schemes relative to population shown in Table 2. 
The work incapacity benefits include sickness al-
lowance converted to person-years and the persons 
who were receiving a pension at the end of the year. 
Daily allowances and pensions are lumped together 
because the statistics outlining the usage of the 
separate systems are not comparable, as the Swedish 
sickness allowances have no maximum duration. It 
should also be noted in Table 2 that in Sweden and 
Norway the same person may be both a recipient 
of work incapacity benefits and a person employed 
through a job creation scheme. In Denmark, these 
two are mutually exclusive. 
Table 2 shows that in Finland the various pro-
grammes for the partly incapacitated are not used 
very much either in the social security sector or in 
the labour market policy sector. Only 4.9% of all 
work incapacity benefit recipients are on partial 
benefits, and only 7.7% of subsidized employment 
is aimed at the partly incapacitated. In Denmark, 
usage of partial benefits in income security is even 
lower than in Finland, but on the other hand more 
than half (54.2%) of all employment measures are 
targeted at the partly incapacitated. In Sweden and 
Norway, one of the aims of disability policy has been 
to guide the usage of benefits towards partial ben-
efits, and the statistics from both countries show that 
this policy has been effective. In 2005, nearly 30% 
of all work incapacity benefits paid in Sweden, and 
Disability policies and employment – Finland compared with the other Nordic Countries 6
almost 1/4 of those in Norway, were partial benefits. 
In subsidized employment, job creation measures 
aimed at the partly incapacitated accounted for 57% 
in Sweden and an impressive 89% in Norway.
Table 2 further shows that the countries with the 
highest incidences of partial work incapacity ben-
efits – Sweden and Norway – are also at the top of the 
list in the overall usage of work incapacity benefits. 
In Sweden and Norway, 13.6% of the working-age 
population were benefit recipients in gross terms 
as compared with 9.4% in Finland and 7.7% in 
Denmark. Partial sickness allowance or disability 
pension was paid to 4.0% of the working-age popu-
lation in Sweden and 3.2% in Norway. 
In labour market policy, the percentage of the 
working-age population involved in job creation 
schemes for the partly incapacitated in Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway was 1.4%, 1.1% and 0.7%, 
respectively. The percentage in Finland was negli-
gible, only 0.1%. Although Sweden and Denmark 
show similar figures for job creation schemes for 
the partly incapacitated, there is a clear difference 
Table 2. Recipients of work incapacity benefits and participants in ALMP-measures for the partly 
incapacitated in the Nordic countries, 2005.
1 Days on sickness benefit in person-years; disability pensions as at year-end. 
   Sources: NOSOSCO 2007; www.kela.fi; www.etk.fi; www.forsakringskassan.se; www.nav.no
2 Source: Eurostat 2007   
3 Source: www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu    
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Recipients of sickness benefit or disability pension, total1 322 700 783 900 404 500 272 300
    of which partial benefit, % 4,9 29,8 23,6 1,6
Recipients of sickness benefit or disability pension as a 
percentage of the 16–64 age group 9,4 13,6 13,6 7,7
     full benefit 8,9 9,5 10,4 7,6
     partial benefit 0,5 4,0 3,2 0,1
Labour market policy measures, subsidized employment2 
total 38 800 147 000 23 000 72 500
Subsidized employment of the partly incapacitated 3 000 83 500 20 400 39 300
      % of all subsidized employment 7,7 56,8 88,7 54,2
Persons in subsidized employment as a percentage of the 
16–64 age group 1,1 2,5 0,8 2,1
Subsidized employment targeted to partly incapacitated 
persons 0,1 1,4 0,7 1,1
     sheltered work 0,1 0,5 0,3 1,0
     wage subsidized employment 0,0 1,0 0,1 0,1
     direct employment measures 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0
Other subsidized employment 1,0 1,1 0,1 0,9
Employment rate among the 15–64 age group, %3 68,4 72,5 74,8 75,9
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between the countries in how job creation schemes 
are divided between sheltered work and subsidized 
employment (Table 2). In Sweden, the partly inca-
pacitated are mainly employed in the open labour 
market through pay subsidies, and another impor-
tant form of job creation is providing sheltered work 
in the government-owned company named Samhall. 
In Denmark, by contrast, ‘flexjobs’ intended for 
the partly incapacitated are considered sheltered 
work and not subsidized employment, because the 
employment relationships in the system are not of 
fixed duration. 
Job creation schemes for other than the partly 
incapacitated involved a roughly equal percentage 
of the working-age population (about 1%) in Fin-
land, Sweden and Denmark. In Norway, the figure 
was only about 0.1%. This would indicate that the 
differences in job creation schemes for the partly 
incapacitated between Finland and the other coun-
tries cannot be solely due to classification, i.e. that 
people employed through targeted measures in the 
other countries would be employed through general 
programmes in Finland. This is also demonstrated 
in the report by Hytti and Hartman (2008), which 
notes that the percentage of the working-age popu-
lation of persons who had a partial work incapacity 
code in the jobseeker register but who participated 
in ‘mainstream’ active labour market policy meas-
ures was roughly the same in Finland and Sweden 
(0.3% and 0.4%, respectively, in 2004). 
The principal question in evaluating the usage of 
social security benefits for the partly incapacitated 
is how these people would be placed in the income 
security system and on the labour market if partial 
benefits were not available. Do the partial benefits 
available in Sweden and Norway encourage people 
to abuse the systems in cases where people with 
health problems could otherwise find and keep a 
full-time job? And, by contrast, does the absence of 
similar targeted benefits and measures in Finland 
lead to the increasing exclusion from working life 
and deterioration of the labour market position 
of the partly incapacitated? Figure 1 examines 
‘absence from paid employment’ due to incapacity 
and unemployment as a whole, taking into account 
both full-time absences and absences due to partial 
benefits. Figure 2, by comparison, shows how job 
creation schemes for the partly incapacitated relate 
to labour market policy measures as a whole. The 
overall usage rate and partial unemployment ben-
efits have been made comparable between countries 
by converting all partial benefits to corresponding 
full benefits. 
Figures 1 and 2, together with the employment 
rates given in Table 2, suggest that the absence of 
benefits and labour market policy for the partly 
incapacitated in Finland has, at least in compari-
son with Sweden, served to channel the partly 
incapacitated into long-term unemployment and 
social exclusion rather than helping people stay in 
full-time employment. The net ‘absence rate’ due 
to work incapacity and unemployment was 19% 
of the working-age population in Finland, whereas 
the figure was 17.0% in Sweden, 15.5% in Denmark 
and 14.8% in Norway. Labour market causes, i.e. 
absence from employment because of early retire-
ment, constituted about half of the ‘overall absence’ 
in Finland and Denmark, about one third in Sweden 
and one fifth in Norway. 
The hypothesis that the partly incapacitated are 
more likely to end up in long-term unemployment 
and threatened by social exclusion in Finland than 
in Sweden can be followed up by comparing the two 
countries with regard to differences in the labour 
force surveys and jobseeker registers on the one 
hand and research findings and statistics on the 
working capacity of unemployed jobseekers on the 
other. Labour force surveys show that the number 
of active unemployed jobseekers, excluding full-
time students, was 247,000 in Sweden and 173,000 
in Finland in 2005. In the same year, the number of 
registered full-time unemployed persons as defined 
by the international standard (which excludes stu-
dents even during holidays) was 241,000 in Sweden 
and 275,000 in Finland. The fact that the difference 
in Sweden is only a few thousand after the exclusion 
of students from the equation demonstrates that 
there are very few long-term unemployed persons 
in Sweden who have given up active jobseeking. 
In Finland, the difference of about 100,000 between 
the number of registered unemployed persons and 
the number of active unemployed jobseekers ac-
cording to the labour force survey corresponds to 
about two thirds of the number of ‘difficult-to-place 
unemployed’ reported by the Ministry of Labour 
(161,900 in 2005, down to 124,800 in 2007). It has 
been shown elsewhere that there have been many 
people among the long-term unemployed affected 
by structural unemployment in Finland whose 
working capacity has significantly decreased and 
whom the authorities have had to guide to apply 
for disability pension (Holm et al. 2006; Hytti and 
Hartman 2008). 
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1 The data are not comparable.
Source: Eurostat 2006 and 2007.
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Structural obstacles must be removed
As pointed out above, the great difference between 
Finland and the other Nordic countries when it 
comes to social security and labour market policy is 
that there are very few benefits and measures aimed 
directly at the partly disabled and partly incapaci-
tated – in some policy sectors, none at all. Also, the 
incentive structures for the reconciliation of the 
labour market and social security in Finland often 
operate in a contradictory and completely opposite 
way from practices in the other Nordic countries. 
Finland differs from the other Nordic countries 
particularly in terms of the employer incentives 
built into the social security system. In the Nordic 
Countries, employers potentially face three different 
kinds of direct costs from liabilities related to short- 
or long-term absence from work due to disability: 
first, the statutory employer period at the beginning 
of sickness absence; second, sick pay after the initiat-
ing period (to the extent that the agreement-based 
pay is greater than the sickness allowance); and third, 
employers’ liabilities due to the experience rating of 
disability benefits.
The ‘potential risks’ for Finnish employers caused 
by employees who are partly incapacitated or have 
a long-term illness involve payment of the full 
wage for the first 10 weekdays of sickness absence, 
after which it is usually paid on the basis of labour 
market agreements. In most cases, the employee’s 
entitlement to sick pay continues for about 4 to 10 
weeks after the statutory employer’s period. During 
this period, the sickness allowance is paid to the 
employer. Among the risks facing large employers 
are, recent legislative reforms notwithstanding, the 
financial liabilities due to the experience rating of 
earnings-related pensions. In the private-sector 
pension scheme, the experience rating was, until 
2006, based on the number of employees in the 
company2.  Since January 2006, the experience-
rated part of the funding of disability pensions has 
been based on contribution categories distributing 
the employer-specific risk over a longer period of 
time. In earnings-related pension systems catering 
to public-sector employees, experience-rating rules 
differ from those applied in the private sector. 
In Finland, arguments have been presented both 
in favour of and against the employment incentive 
effect of experience rating in the earnings-related 
pension system. Experience rating may make it more 
difficult for workers at a great risk of disability to 
find employment. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that experience rating can act as a motivating 
factor for employers to invest in the maintenance of 
health and working capacity and in the rehabilita-
tion of their work force.   
The structural obstacles imposed by social security 
are a significant hindrance particularly regarding 
the employment of persons with a long-term illness 
whose application for a disability pension has been 
turned down after they have spent the maximum 
period allowable on sickness allowance or who are 
trying to re-enter working life after the end of a 
fixed-term disability pension (rehabilitation sup-
port). In their cases, the employer’s risk is that the 
person in question is not entitled to sickness al-
lowance because of the same illness as before until 
that person has been capable of work for one year 
without that same illness affecting his/her working 
capacity. What this means in practice is that an 
employer hiring such an employee would not be en-
titled to sickness allowance for the agreement-based 
pay period. Some research findings indicate that if 
a person has his/her pension application rejected, 
in practice, the only way in which he/she can re-
enter working life is if he/she is in an employment 
relationship at the time of the application being 
rejected (see Hytti and Hartman 2008; Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health 2008). According to Gould 
et al. (2007), it was found in a study of private-sector 
pension applicants that even among persons who 
fulfilled the above criterion only about half were 
still in paid employment one year later.
In the other Nordic countries, there are exceptions to 
the statutory sick pay, i.e. the period of 2 to 3 weeks 
during which the employer alone is responsible for 
sick pay, concerning employees who are assessed 
to have a risk to be frequently absent from work 
because of their illness. In Denmark, employers 
providing sheltered, pay-subsidized work are also 
exempt from the employer sick pay period. In Den-
mark and Norway, the employer’s liability regarding 
low-income employees who are in a weak position 
on the labour market is also decreased by the fact 
that there is 100% compensation for sickness allow-
ance for work income below a certain income cap 
and therefore there is no agreement-based compo-
nent which the employer would have to contribute 
2  Until 2006, a private-sector employer with 50 or more employees paid a 
share of the capital value of disability and unemployment pensions from the 
beginning of the pension period to the old-age retirement age; this share 
increased with the size of the firm. For employers with 800 or more employ-
ees, the share was equal to 80%. Since 1 January 2006 the experience-rated 
part of the disability pension funding has been based on contribution cat-
egories.
Disability policies and employment – Finland compared with the other Nordic Countries 10
(Hytti 2006). In Sweden too, the employer’s liability 
for pay during absence due to sickness is clearly 
less than in Finland, particularly regarding private-
sector employees. (The full sickness allowance, 
however, was experience-rated in Sweden from the 
beginning of 2005 to the end of 2006. See Hytti and 
Hartman 2008). 
Finnish health insurance and employment contracts 
legislation does not specify any kind of exceptions or 
alleviations to employer contributions with regard 
to the hiring of partly incapacitated employees. On 
the other hand, the maternity leave payment obliga-
tions of employers were eased in Finland from the 
beginning of this year with the compensation rate 
for the maternity allowance being raised to 90% 
for the 56 weekdays compensated as maternity 
leave. One reason for this reform was to reduce 
discrimination due to motherhood in connection 
with equality-oriented improvement in social rights 
in various sectors. There has been no debate of the 
need for a similar legislative reform in sickness al-
lowance.
One of the major differences in the income security 
and labour market policy regarding the partly in-
capacitated between Finland and the other Nordic 
countries is that the systems operate according to 
a different logic as far as the employer incentives 
are concerned. In the other Nordic countries, the 
guiding principle seems to be that an employer 
only pays the employee for productive work, while 
society takes care of the rest in the form of a partial 
benefit or a pay subsidy. In Finland, by contrast, 
the aim is to encourage employers to keep less 
productive employees in full-time employment. 
Also, Finnish employers have evidently wanted to 
retain the system of relatively high direct costs ac-
cruing to them through absences due to sickness 
and disability pensions, so as to keep under control 
the total social expenditure and hence the costs 
which employers collectively pay for in the form of 
insurance premiums. However, the question may 
be put whether discrimination against those in a 
weak labour market position can be justified on the 
basis of curbing excessive expenditure in benefits 
and labour market policy measures, and whether 
this logic is feasible in a scenario where a declining 
labour force increases the need for employers to 
retain their employees.
Trends in Finland’s disability policy 
– what can we learn from the other 
Nordic countries? 
The other Nordic countries are the most obvious 
comparison for Finland with regard to income 
security and labour market policy measures for the 
partly incapacitated. It could hardly be said that 
there is a single ‘best practice’ country that should 
be followed. The Danish model looks the most ro-
bust on the basis of the above in the sense that the 
usage of disability benefits has stayed under control, 
while the partly incapacitated who nevertheless are 
capable of working to some extent are guaranteed, 
on public support, the chance to work as their work-
ing capacity allows. 
On the other hand, we do not know how well the 
needs of partly incapacitated employees are actually 
taken into account in heavily subsidized sheltered 
work. For example, we may ask whether these 
employees are stigmatized in the workplace and 
whether they feel that they have been forced into 
sheltered work because there are no partial work 
incapacity benefits? A requirement in the applica-
tion of the Danish model would seem to be a rela-
tively high level of employment when the system is 
introduced. It would hardly be possible to guarantee 
jobs for all the partly incapacitated during severe 
structural unemployment.
In Sweden, and to some extent in Norway too, 
there is some over-usage of the system of disability 
benefits and job creation schemes for the partly 
incapacitated, but this is not to say that adopting 
certain features of this system would ‘infect Finland 
with this Swedish disease’. In Sweden, the ‘over-us-
age’ of sickness benefits has been almost exclusively 
a women’s problem, related to a large extent to the 
structures of the labour market in Sweden, which 
favours part-time employment in other respects too. 
All social partners in Sweden, including employers, 
have adapted their operations to fit the part-time 
model, and this extends to the usage of benefits too 
(see Hytti and Hartman 2008). In Finland, there 
are scarcely any similar mechanisms to guide the 
usage of benefits, because there is no market for 
women’s part-time work in the same sense as there 
is in Sweden.
Despite the problems observed, our neighbouring 
countries can, however, teach us how to build up dis-
ability policy to support the social participation of 
people in a weak position on the labour market and 
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how to give them the opportunity to utilize their re-
maining working capacity. Shifting the policy focus 
in Finland is essential for two reasons: what labour 
reserves there are may mainly be found among the 
groups who are in a weak position on the labour 
market, and the greatest welfare gaps are to be found 
in these groups too. The danger is that the necessary 
changes will not be implemented fully, resulting in 
contradictions in the relationships between vari-
ous schemes and incentive structures. Besides the 
policy measures discussed above, this package of 
necessary changes includes strengthening the social 
security and labour market policy service structures 
and providing for unemployment security for the 
partly incapacitated in cases where no suitable em-
ployment is available to augment the income of the 
partly incapacitated benefit recipient. 
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